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1The Grand Experiment of Communism 2
February 1848: ￿The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims.
They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible
overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble
at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but
their chains. They have a world to win.￿Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Manifesto of the Communist Party.1
September 2010: ￿There were many odd things about my recent Havana
stopover [...] but one of the most unusual was Fidel Castro￿ s level of self-
re￿ ection. [...] I asked him if he believed the Cuban model was still something
worth exporting. ￿ The Cuban model doesn￿ t even work for us anymore,￿he
said.￿Je⁄rey Goldberg, ￿Fidel: ￿ Cuban Model Doesn￿ t Even Work for Us
Anymore￿ ,￿The Atlantic.2
1 Why Another Fable of the Grand Experiment?
Communism was the grand illusion of the 20-th century. It was also its grand exper-
iment. In terms of utopian vision, radical implementation and socioeconomic impact,
communism has left a lasting mark in history. The rise and fall of communism is a com-
plex and multi-faceted theme interpreted from di⁄erent theoretical and methodological
perspectives in social sciences. Works from many disciplines, going beyond politics and
economics, have tried to portray or, more ambitiously, explain the various manifesta-
tions of communism across the map of the world ￿from nascent and militant through
mature and oppressive into stagnating and decaying.
So why another attempt to reconsider the key driving mechanisms behind the genesis
of the revolutionary communist project and the gradual mass disillusionment with its
realities? The novelty of our approach consists in using economic theory to examine the
interactive dynamics of economic incentives and social preferences in a society experi-
menting with an economic system that has never been implemented before. We focus on
the scenario that led to the October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent establish-
ment of the Soviet Union in a big region of the world where capitalism was less developed
and, perhaps more importantly, any democratization of the society was avoided or much
delayed. Our model also accommodates the alternative scenario explored in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000), where democratic reforms such as the extension of the franchise
and the increase of redistribution have enabled Western European countries to avoid the
revolutionary advent of communism.
In what follows, we build a single model to formalize the socioeconomic process that
led to communism via a forced revolution and nationalization of capital, as well as its
reversal back to markets. In essence, this grand experiment has led to the discovery of
a trade-o⁄ between equality and e¢ ciency in terms of productivity at the scale of alter-
native economic systems.3 Our theoretical account of the rise and fall of communism,
1Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Oppo-




3For instance, Stretton (1976) writes: ￿Equalities can always be ill-designed, or enforced by oppressive
methods. When they are, they may reduce productivity, as well as freedom. Some communist countriesFarvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 3
from the revolutionary enthusiasm of Marx and Engels through the disillusionment of
Castro we quoted in the beginning, is framed as a stylized game of class struggle involv-
ing economic decisions, transmission of ideology across generations and social learning.
This is along the lines of North (2005), who interprets the experience with communism
in Russia as ￿a story of perceived reality ! beliefs ! institutions ! policies ! altered
perceived reality and on and on.￿(p. 4). Aoki (2011) further describes the role of in-
stitutions as ￿social artifacts that cognitively mediate agents￿strategic interactions and
their individual beliefs in societal games￿ .4
We model two types of agents, inequality-averse and ine¢ ciency-averse ones, re-
sponding to economic incentives and transmitting their values as they are a⁄ected by
evolving economic outcomes. While the mechanism in Bisin and Verdier (2001) is gener-
ally applied to show how intergenerational transmission of attitudes explains the persis-
tence of socioeconomic status across generations, we use the transmission and evolution
of preferences to shed light on the dynamics of regime switches across economic sys-
tems.5 In particular, we ￿rst show how capital accumulation by the minority elite and
the resulting inequality leads to increasing social discontent over time and, eventually,
the overthrow of the system. We then show how a centrally-planned system aimed at
equality also fades away due to misalignment of individual and aggregate incentives,
lower well-being and the gradual redirection of ideas towards a market system.6
The incentive structure under the two economic systems is captured in our model by
the (mis)alignment of ownership and control. This is in line with the large literature on
the key weaknesses of socialism: one strand dealing with the pervasive problems arising
from the ￿ soft budget constraints￿of socialist enterprises (e.g., Kornai, 1980) ￿what
Roemer (2009) labels ￿ lack of incentives￿ ; another pointing to the overambitious task
of central planning, given ￿ dispersed and local information￿ , to ensure better allocative
decisions than markets (e.g., von Hayek, 1940, 1945) ￿what Roemer (2009) labels ￿ lack of
coordination￿ . Our approach highlights these two familiar disadvantages of a communist
economy at their crucial link, the intertemporal optimization decision, at which the
(mis)alignment of ownership and control manifests itself. The choice of consumption
and accumulation out of one￿ s own wealth given the signals of competitive markets and
locally relevant information under capitalism sustains e¢ ciency but generates inequality.
Delegating this choice to an egalitarian planner forces equality by revolution but erodes
economic e¢ ciency, thus making everyone equal in their poverty.7
Combining features of the above literatures, we devise a non-cooperative game be-
have ￿ attened their margin for skill or hard work too far, with apparently bad e⁄ect on economy
e¢ ciency.￿
4This view somewhat departs from earlier seminal works on communism versus capitalism, and related
studies on the comparative e¢ ciency of the two systems. Among many others, see Lange (1956 [1936]),
von Hayek (1940, 1945), Tinbergen (1960), Lancaster (1973), Kornai (1980), Roemer (1980, 1985).
5See Bisin and Verdier (2010) for a survey of literature. Also recent empirical work in Dohmen et al.
(2011) for instance show evidence in the context of attitudes towards trust being passed over generations
and how the inertia works against the e⁄ect of institutional change that might be expected to change
willingness to trust.
6Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) study the role of the intergenerational transmission of taste for leisure
and patience in the success of institutional changes brought about by the industrial revolution. See also
Saint-Paul (2010) on the impact of the evolution of beliefs on ideological bias in the society and political
reform.
7Note that we ignore neither that inequalities were de facto existing in communist countries, nor that
they were creating resentment (see, e.g., Joo, 2005, for an account). However, considering explicitly the
nomenklatura would only complicate the model without changing the substance of the results (in e⁄ect,
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tween agent types that takes place in every period of an overlapping-generations (OLG)
framework to demonstrate how the equilibrium strategies drive the long-run socioeco-
nomic dynamics and can generate such pendulum-like switch from markets to an egali-
tarian economy abolishing private ownership, and back to rebuilding market incentives
to sustain society. The economic literature, and the literature on communism or social
evolution more generally, has not provided so far a consistent theory on the institutional
change experienced by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries in Eastern Europe
throughout the 20-th century accounting for both these transitions. In this consists the
contribution of our simple and stylized but historically trust-worthy formal analysis of
the rise and fall of communism.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct our model, pre-
senting the types of agents, their objectives, constraints, ideological con￿ ict, and the
transmission of their beliefs across generations. Section 3 then solves the optimization
problems of the agent types and the von Stackelberg game between them. Section 4
derives the intergenerational dynamics and highlights the resulting economic outcomes.
The last section concludes by placing our theory in the context of more discursive inter-
pretations of long-run economic changes. The Appendix provides additional derivation
details on the within-period von Stackelberg game, itself replayed in each subsequent
generation.
2 The Model
2.1 Economic Systems, Agent Types and Con￿ ict
We consider two economic systems under which society can evolve: one is market-
based (capitalist), denoted by M, and the other centrally-planned (communist), denoted
by C. True to the historical genesis of communist ideas, our analysis begins with a
market-based system founded upon property rights over the means of production and the
corresponding private incentives to capital accumulation. Our interest is in a particular
region that at some point in time splits apart and experiments with communism. Its
total adult population is normalized to 1.
There are two types of agents in the initial capitalist society. The large majority are
born without inheriting capital: they are the ￿ workers￿ . They are ￿ unprivileged￿in the
sense that they can only sell their labor force in the market in order to subsist, as Marx
argued. Being the have-nots, they care about inequality in the capitalist society, whose
victim they are by birth. We call them inequality-averse agents and denote their type as
A. A minority of agents are born with inherited capital: they are the ￿ capitalists￿ . They
extract rents from their private capital, and care about the relative ine¢ ciency between
the two systems. We call them ine¢ ciency-averse agents and denote their type as B.
Initially, types (A and B) and ￿ classes￿(workers and capital owners) coincide, by
de￿nition. In a conventional way, this can be interpreted in terms of the class struggle
between capital and labor. However, over time preference types evolve, so that class
and preference type may diverge. We consider an OLG model, where agents live for two
periods. During childhood (in the ￿rst period of life), they are ￿ socialized￿and acquire a
particular type just when becoming adult. When mature (in the second period of life),
they perform active economic and ideological roles in the society, and die at the end of
the period, investing any capital wealth they have accumulated.
Under both systems, M and C, economic power belongs to the preference type who
decides upon ￿and enforces ￿the intertemporal allocation between capital accumulationFarvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 5
and consumption. The other preference type can then only try to change the economic
system through ideological in￿ uence. We denote the degree of strength of each type
relative to the other by the con￿ ict function qt (￿) and 1 ￿ qt (￿), respectively for types
A and B in any period t, and measure it by an index, 0 < qt (￿) < 1. More precisely,
this index can be de￿ned to be some increasing function of the relative intensity of
the preference itself (social resentment or ideological determination), 0 < mt < 1, and
the relative size (or fraction) of each preference type in the total adult population,
0 < nt < 1: 0 < qt (mt;nt) < 1, with
@qt(￿)
@mt > 0 and
@qt(￿)
@nt > 0. It also captures
the probability of a regime shift in any period t.8 It will be seen that such economic
transitions can only occur once the strength of the oppressed type dominates that of the
ruling type: qt (￿) > 0:5 for A and 1 ￿ qt (￿) > 0:5 for B.
2.2 Preferences











j;t denoting individual consumption levels, bi
j;t+1 the private or social returns from
intergenerational transfers,9 and 0 < ￿ < 1 the discount factor assumed to be identical
for all agents. The third term generally represents the disutility from a change in the
system of property rights and control, which also implies that relative status, or reference
points, with respect to others matter as well. More precisely, EA
t (￿t) and EB
t (￿t) are
the expected inequality and ine¢ ciency that depend on the regime in the next period
EA
t (￿t) = qt+1 ln￿C;t + (1 ￿ qt+1)ln￿M;t; (2)
EB
t (￿t) = qt+1 ln￿C;t + (1 ￿ qt+1)ln￿M;t; (3)
where ￿j;t measures income of type B relative to A, or inequality within the society
at t, and ￿j;t the relative e¢ ciency, in terms of productivity and potential growth pos-
sibilities, of individual optimization under market capitalism over a centrally planned
communist system. Note that communism forcefully proclaims complete equality in the
society, ￿C;t = 1, yielding ln￿C = 0. Similarly, ine¢ ciency is initially normalized under
capitalism, ￿M;t = 1, and so ln￿M = 0. ￿M;t and ￿C;t will be de￿ned further below. The
relative strength of the preference types, qt+1, determines the probability of a regime
change in period t + 1. Finally, utility depends on costly socialization e⁄ort functions
￿A
t (￿t) and ￿B
t (￿t), with 0 ￿ ￿i
t (￿) ￿ 1, to be discussed in section 2.5.
2.3 Production and Income
We consider a one-sector real model where a single good is produced using a constant-
returns-to-scale technology. The output produced at time t in regime j is
H(Aj;t;Kj;t;L) = Aj;t f(￿Kj;t)￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿)L]￿g
1
￿ (4)
8Alternatively, Ellis and Fender (2011) show how a revolution can materialize under full rationality
in a set-up of Bayesian perfect equilibrium with asymmetric information.
9Note that this formulation is equivalent to dynastic OLG models with altruistic preferences ￿ la
Barro (1974), where owners of capital leave a stock of wealth to their descendants as a bequest.The Grand Experiment of Communism 6
for j = C;M and depends on two productive factors, capital Kj;t depreciating fully
during t and labor L supplied inelastically by households. To further simplify matters,
we focus on the case of ￿ = 1, which implies perfect substitutability between capital
and labor. The technological parameter Aj;t ￿ A(wj;t) measures productivity. As
will be made clear, Aj;t can be thought of as a function of managerial and technical
skills developed for improving the production process, determined by the incentives of
workers. We approximate incentives by wages in workers￿families, or their material well-
being based on consumption. The relative importance of capital and labor in producing
output are denoted by ￿ and 1￿￿, respectively. Returns to labor and capital can then
be written as
wj;t = (1 ￿ ￿)Aj;t
and
rj;t = ￿Aj;t:
Both factor returns are j-indexed, because of the potentially di⁄erent productivity levels
under the two systems.
We consider a subsistence consumption level ￿ c, never reached by the A type so that
only capital owners can invest. In the market system, income for capital owners and






t￿1 is savings in the previous period, and
yA
M;t = wM;t = (1 ￿ ￿)AM;t: (6)
Under communism, capital is nationalized, i.e. capitalists are deprived of their own-
ership, and investment decisions are no longer individual but made by the egalitarian
planner. As a consequence, individual income becomes a centralized allocation of an
equal share of output to each member of the society, i.e. wage:
yB
C;t = yA
C;t = wC;t = (1 ￿ ￿)AC;t: (7)
Note that in this case the whole population, including B types, forms the working class
(cA
C;t = cB
C;t = cC;t = wC;t).
Income inequality arising from saving decisions by capitalists made in period t is










where imposing the initial condition yB
M;0 > yA
M;0 prevents a capitalist from switching
types and becoming a worker. Index ￿M;t is in other words a measure of income from
capital versus that from labor in period t.
2.4 Savings and E¢ ciency
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The timing of events during the accumulation process is as follows: the savings of
the previous period sB
t￿1 comprise the private capital stock of each type B agent in the
present period kM;t, which will then be put into production given (4). The private yields
from capital ownership yB
M;t = rM;tst￿1 are then divided between consumption cB
t and
savings sB
t (forming the future capital stock).
An egalitarian planner instead maximizes utility (1) in the name of the type A agents
under the national budget constraint
Ct + St ￿ HC;t: (10)
The savings decision by the planner di⁄ers from private ones in that aggregate values
are considered (which we denote by uppercase Ct, Kt, St;Yt). The same timing holds
for the accumulation process under the communist regime: St￿1 comprises Kt, which is
used for national production along with labor and yields Yt = rC;tSt￿1. Total output,
HC;t, is then allocated between further savings, St, and aggregate consumption in the
society, Ct, divided equally among all agents via identical wages assigned to all workers,
wC;t = cC;t. Note that in this regime there is no market price of capital, therefore rC;t
is the shadow price of capital referred to in period t by the planner.
We can now de￿ne the (inverse) ine¢ ciency index of the communist system, ￿C;t,














t is the optimal savings chosen by the egalitarian planner, and ^ sB
t a notional value
computed by individuals should the market system be operative. Index ￿C;t is in other
words a measure of income from capital under markets versus that under communism
in period t.
2.5 Intergenerational Transmission of Beliefs
We assume that type A agents always teach a communist ideology to their o⁄spring
to abolish inequality, while type B agents always teach a pro-market ideology favoring
e¢ ciency. This is a ￿rst channel of transmitting beliefs that captures the in￿ uence on
ideology intensity within the family, and corresponds to what is termed ￿ direct vertical
transmission￿in the literature (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2010). The evolution over time
of the relative degree of ideological determination to change the status quo, however,
is also a⁄ected outside the family. This second channel operates through the in￿ uence
on ideology intensity by peers and the broader environment, and is known as ￿ oblique
transmission￿ .
Socialization e⁄orts ￿i
t (￿) a⁄ect the determination of the next generation to mobilize
in order to change the system. Socialization e⁄ort by type A, ￿A(￿t), is generated by
resentment from inequality ￿t, and for type B, ￿B(￿t), by the inferior e¢ ciency with
respect to markets ￿t. The properties of these socialization functions are standard:
￿i(1) = 0; ￿i 0(￿) > 0; ￿i 00(￿) < 0: (12)
Property ￿i
t(1) = 0 in (12) states that socialization e⁄ort is only activated upon
su⁄erance.10
10This is a special case of Bisin and Verdier (2001) arising from resentment, where only one agent type
at a time engages in the transmission of his preferences. The use of this setting allows us to simplify
our notation, while maintaining the generality of our results.The Grand Experiment of Communism 8
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 presents the socialization process of the agents of each type, A and B. The
transition probabilities at time t, P
i"
t , that a parent of type i has a child with a stronger
(") or weaker (#) ideological determination can be written as
P
A"
t = ￿A(￿t) + [1 ￿ ￿A(￿t)]qt;
P
A#
t = [1 ￿ ￿A(￿t)](1 ￿ qt);
P
B"
t = ￿B(￿t) + [1 ￿ ￿B(￿t)](1 ￿ qt);
P
B#
t = [1 ￿ ￿B(￿t)]qt: (13)
Given these transition probabilities, the relative strength of individuals of type A in
period t + 1 is
qt+1 = qtP
A"
t + (1 ￿ qt)P
B#
t
= qt + (qt ￿ q2
t)[￿A(￿t) ￿ ￿B(￿t)]: (14)
The dynamics of the probability of a regime shift are endogenous to the present economic
situation and depend on the disutility experienced by each type. The properties of the
socialization functions imply that ￿A
t (￿t) = 0 under communism while ￿B
t (￿t) = 0 under
a market economy. Accordingly, the law of motion in (14) simpli￿es to
qM;t+1 = qM;t + (qM;t ￿ q2
M;t)￿A(￿t) (15)
under markets and to
qC;t+1 = qC;t ￿ (qC;t ￿ q2
C;t)￿B(￿t) (16)
under communism.
Thus, in the market system the degree of ideological determination of type A to
change the status quo, qM;t+1, increases with any positive socialization e⁄ort by type
A, ￿A(￿t) > 0. Above the critical value qM;t = 0:5, the threat to overthrow the cap-
italist regime becomes credible. Analogously, in the communist system the ideological
determination of type B to change the status quo increases, i.e. 1 ￿ qC;t+1 increases,
with any positive socialization e⁄ort by type B, ￿B(￿t) > 0. Above the critical value
1 ￿ qC;t = 0:5, the threat to abolish the communist regime as type B agents promote
market values becomes credible.
3 Economic Systems and Interaction of Agents
We assume a plausible sequencing of actions appropriate for both economic systems, in
which the agent type who exercises ownership and control (economic power) to decide
on the split between consumption and saving moves ￿rst. The agent type who has
no ownership and control rights can only have socialization (or ideological) power by
instilling beliefs against the regime in force, that is, trying to teach the next generation
in favour of his/her own values. The sequence of events at time t is illustrated in Figure
2 parallel to the process of capital accumulation in the same period (see Section 2.4).
[Figure 2 about here]Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 9
3.1 Market-Based Economy
In the market system, capitalists both own the capital stock and control the allocation
of their income between consumption and savings, to be invested and used to produce
in the next period by the next generation. In contrast, workers do not own and control
anything apart from their labor force, which they supply inelastically in the model. It
is therefore optimal saving and capital accumulation within the capitalist ￿ dynasties￿
(where ownership and control rights are aligned and e⁄ective) that drives the e¢ ciency
and sustainability of the market system, but deepens the social inequality.
The type B agents in this case are the ￿rst movers in a von Stackelberg leadership
game and decide on savings, while taking into consideration in their maximization prob-
lem the socialization reaction of type A agents to the inequality caused by their own
savings. Starting with type A agents (the working class), they take savings as ￿xed and













where we have substituted for EA
t (￿t) from (2) after noting that ln￿C;t = 0. Replacing






























￿ ￿A(￿t)￿A 0(￿t) = 0








This equation delivers a preliminary insight on the mechanisms that drive the evolu-
tion from one system to another. It is easy to see that an increase in the private savings
(by the capitalists) leads to increased socialization e⁄ort by type A agents. The latter
can only expect a growing inequality between the two types of agents, which reinforces
their determination to change the regime. More precisely, the higher the expected in-
equality, the higher the e⁄ort to transmit their preferences towards a more equal society.
















Note that savings by capitalists have no direct negative externality on productivity
because the decision is made at an individual level and consumption by workers cA
M;t
is not a⁄ected by it. The productivity AM;t hence is at that point assumed to be non-
decreasing over time as long as markets are in place, or ￿to sharpen our analysis ￿toThe Grand Experiment of Communism 10
remain at its initial value AM;0.11 This enables us to hereafter drop the time subscript
to consumption in the productivity function under markets so that AM;t = AM;0 = AM.
After a series of substitutions (see Appendix A.1) and omitting the M-subscript to






t￿1 + (￿￿AM ￿ 1)sB
t ￿
￿








Replacing for ￿A(￿t) with the optimal reaction of type A agents from (17) and taking























where AM > 1=￿￿ must hold for positive savings by the capital owners. The last
equation reveals that increased expected ine¢ ciency under the alternative (communist)
system induces higher accumulation by capital owners in an e⁄ort to further consoli-
date the capital stock and, hence, the productive potential of the market economy. In
addition, the higher the productivity AM the lower the need to save.
Substituting (18) back into (17) to derive the optimal socialization e⁄ort of the type
A in its ￿nal form, we get





Substituting ￿A(￿t)￿ from (19) into (14), next-period ideological determination of
type A to change the status quo becomes
qt+1 = qt + (qt ￿ q2
t)￿A(￿t)￿
= qt + q2





It is seen from (20) that the evolution of qt over time under a market system takes









Lemma 1 Given the initial condition yB
M;0 > yA
M;0, optimal individual savings by capital
owners sB￿
t always increase inequality, provoking type-A workers into more intensive
transmission of their social discontent and more e⁄ort to instigate a regime change.




> 0 increases ￿A(￿t)￿ and qt+1 in (19) and
(20), respectively.
In sum, capital owners allocate their income between consumption and savings, the
type A agents then react by choosing their socialization e⁄ort, which in turn a⁄ects the
ideological determination and strength of the next generation of A types to change the
status quo.
11Allowing AM;t to increase over time only strengthens the mechanism at work in our model and
results in the same outcomes.Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 11
3.2 Centrally-Planned Economy
Under communism, no one makes economic decisions apart from the egalitarian planner,
who is of type A and splits total consumption equally across all members of society.12
After the nationalization following the communist revolution the society, de jure (but
not de facto) owning the capital, delegates control to the egalitarian planner. Individu-
als do not control the choice of aggregate consumption and investment out of national
income, which is also national output. Thus, under communism, there is misalignment
of ownership and control rights creating ine¢ ciency. We capture and interpret it in com-
paring the optimization problems under central planning (aggregate, then disaggregated
top-down by equal split) vis-￿-vis the market (individual, aggregated bottom-up).
The egalitarian planner is the ￿rst mover and takes into consideration the socializa-
tion reaction of type B agents to the relative e¢ ciency of the system caused by their
centralized decision. Starting with type B agents (market advocates), they take savings














where we have substituted for EB
t (￿t) from (3) after noting that ln￿M;t = 0. Replacing





























￿ ￿B(￿t)￿B 0(￿t) = 0







Hence, an increase in the planner￿ s aggregate savings directly reduces the socializa-
tion e⁄ort by type B agents. This is due to the fact that, as seen in (11), such an
increase gives a boost to the e¢ ciency of the communist system. While this e⁄ect per
se could reduce ine¢ ciency, it will be seen below that this accumulation process has an
adverse e⁄ect on productivity, leaving the total e⁄ect of aggregate savings on relative
e¢ ciency of the system and socialization e⁄ort by the type B agents who share the
values of capital owners ambiguous.13
The egalitarian planner as a ￿rst mover maximizes utility in the name of the type
A agents taking into account aggregate values. Therefore, the egalitarian planner (not
individual capitalists, whose capital has been nationalized) optimally chooses the level
of aggregate savings, i.e. national investment. This also determines the allocation of
output to be distributed equally among the total population for consumption.
12This follows our assumption of inequality aversion characterizing type A agents, to conform with
the preference for equality among the thinkers and pioneers of communism. Di⁄erent from maximizing
social welfare, it presumes that the central planner himself experiences a disutility from inequality.
13This ambiguity resembles historical evidence such as those in Broadberry and Klein (2011), who for
example shows Czechoslovakia￿ s comparative productivity position under the central planning regime








s.t. Ct + St ￿ HC;t:
Parallel to the market economy, the planner takes ￿Yt+1 as the value of the inter-
generational transfer in his optimization problem using the shadow price of capital rC;t
(Yt+1 = rC;tSt = ￿AC;tSt). However, it will be seen below that the social returns to
capital realized in t + 1 turn out to be lower than those evaluated by the shadow price
(￿AC;t+1St < ￿AC;tSt). This is due to an externality caused by productivity becoming
a function of consumption, which is now changing over time in the new economic sys-
tem, AM ! A(cj;t).14 Furthermore, A0(￿) > 0 represents the incentive of the society to
engage in technological progress as a function of consumption, and A00(￿) < 0 assures
that productivity gains are decreasing.15
Aggregate decision making by an egalitarian planner under a communist regime
a⁄ects total and per capita levels of consumption, therefore changing productivity over
time. This is because the national budget constraint implies Ct + St = HC;t, that is,
output in the aggregate has to be equal to the sum of consumption and investment in
every period. Therefore, each individual gets an identical consumption level equal to
the assigned wage by the planner




Since allocation between saving and consumption takes place after production in each
period, consumption in t determines productivity in the following period t + 1.
Lemma 2 The budget constraint of an egalitarian planner in (10), Ct + St = HC;t,
implies that higher aggregate savings cut consumption by the whole population. This
results in a negative e⁄ect on productivity AC;t+1 and makes the latter time-dependent.















Substituting further from Appendix A.2, we obtain:
max
St









Replacing for ￿B(￿t) with the optimal reaction curve by type B agents derived in
(22) and taking the ￿rst-order condition yields:
14Similar results are obtained when treating utility from the intergenerational transfer as the amount
of capital left to produce in the next period, Kt+1. This could, for instance, account for the attempt to
catch up due to a lower capital base in the communist region or to the loss of capital as a consequence
of destruction during the revolution.
15In a somewhat related context, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) assume productivity to be higher in




= (￿￿AC;t ￿ 1) +
q2






t(1 ￿ qt)2 ln(￿M;t)
1 ￿ ￿￿AC;t
; (24)
where AC;t < 1
￿￿ must hold for positive savings by the planner. The last equation
notably reveals that increased expected inequality under the alternative (market) system
induces higher savings by the egalitarian planner in an e⁄ort to further consolidate the
capital stock and, hence, the productive potential of the communist system. In addition,
putting the requirements to have positive (optimal) savings under both economic systems





which translate into the lower bound on capitalist productivity being the upper bound
on communist productivity.
Substituting (24) back into (22) to derive the optimal socialization e⁄ort of type B
in its ￿nal form, we get
￿B








And now substituting ￿B
t (￿t)￿ from (25) into (14), the next-period proportion of the
population in favor of a market-based system becomes
qt+1 = qt ￿ (qt ￿ q2
t)￿B(￿t)￿
= qt ￿ q2








It immediately appears from (26) that the ideological stance of type A￿ s relative to








which will turn out to be the initial condition at the moment of the revolution, T, due to
destruction of some fraction of the capital stock (see section 3.3 to follow immediately).
Ine¢ ciency increases when the direct positive e⁄ect of aggregate savings S￿
t on e¢ ciency
is dominated by its negative e⁄ect via productivity in the next period, AC;t+1. In words,
when the egalitarian planner increases aggregate savings S￿
t to trigger an acceleration
of the accumulation process and a fall in ￿C;t, he must assign a lower consumption level
to all workers according to Lemma 2. Since productivity depends positively on wages,
worker incentives to upgrade the production process and therefore productivity under
communism, AC;t+1, are reduced. If the latter e⁄ect dominates, ine¢ ciency increases
and type B agents recruit intertemporally by increasing their socialization e⁄ort.16
16Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) discuss the disincentive e⁄ects on work of welfare-state arrangements,
stressing in particular that the ￿negative e⁄ects of the poor incentives for work in former socialist
countries in Eastern Europe also seem to have materialized with a time lag￿ .The Grand Experiment of Communism 14
Lemma 3 Savings by the egalitarian planner have a negative e⁄ect over time if the





t < 0) domi-
nates the direct positive e⁄ect of savings on e¢ ciency,
@￿C;t+1
@S￿
t+1 > 0. When this condition
holds, saving by the egalitarian planner leads type B agents into more propaganda to
proliferate market ideas and to stimulate transition.
Proof. Ine¢ ciency in period t + 1 increases if the direct positive e⁄ect of saving in


























t < 0 from (23).
Looking back at the production function in (4) and recalling S￿
t = Kt+1 reveals that
Lemma 3 also entails a strong marginal loss of productivity from lower consumption that
prevents HC;t to grow over time. This rules out the possibility of investments raising total
output over time and bringing by higher consumption possibilities. In order to simplify
the exposition of the model and focus on our area of interest, we assume hereafter that
the condition in Lemma 3 holds.
In sum, the egalitarian planner allocates national income between consumption and
savings at the aggregate level, the type B agents then react by choosing their socializa-
tion e⁄ort to in￿ uence the ideology of the rest of the society (type A). The proportion









that although savings directly increase productivity in support of communism, the dis-
incentives created by reduced consumption due to more government savings increases
the relative strength of type B￿ s to change the status quo (now also proportion of the
population who sympathize with communism, as more agents convert to the type B
ideology).17
3.3 The Moment of Revolution
Before analyzing the dynamics of capital accumulation, it is helpful to have a closer look
at the ￿rst period immediately following the communist revolution, T. Aggregating all
capital stock in the hands of the individual capitalists that has been nationalized at
the beginning of T and taking into account the costs of the revolution in terms of a
destroyed fraction of capital 1 ￿ ￿, we get:
(1 ￿ nT)sB
T￿1 = (1 ￿ nT)kT
revolution )
cost (loss)




@AC;t+1 < 0; that is, socialization e⁄ort by type B increases due to decreased
consumption, incentives, and productivity. For an insight on the reduced consumption opportunities
delivered by communist regimes, see for example Bergson (1991).Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 15
The left-hand side of this expression is the capital stock invested by the individual
capitalists just before the revolution and aggregated at the national level, (1 ￿ nT)sB
T￿1;
the right-hand side is the same capital stock after accounting for the capital losses dur-
ing the revolution and the nationalization of all the inherited and surviving capital,
￿(1 ￿ nT)kT. The latter capital stock, KT, is what remains for the egalitarian planner
to put into production in period T and, obviously, KT < (1 ￿ nT)kT. Note that produc-
tivity in T does not change leaving the planner with unchanged productivity, AM, but a
lower capital stock, KT. This results in reduced output in T relative to T ￿1, inducing
the planner to increase savings in his very ￿rst intertemporal allocation decision. Such
a decision could, of course, be motivated by the need to rebuild the capital base and
compensate for the loss from the revolution, or to catch up with the rest of the world.
From then on, in essence, period T has a lagged e⁄ect on output in period T +1 via
two channels: (i) increasing the capital stock, KT+1 = ￿ST, through more savings in the
preceding period increases output, HT+1; (ii) also decreasing wages and consumption
that are equally assigned to all workers as from period T; this reduces productivity in
the next period AC;T+1 resulting in a lower output HT+1. To sum up, if Lemma 3 holds,
an elastic negative response of productivity to savings across generations is ensured and
communism is not sustainable in the long run.
4 Intergenerational Dynamics and Economic Outcomes
In this section, we highlight our principal analytical ￿ndings derived from the dynamics
of qt and the resulting economic outcomes. That is, having precedingly analyzed the
within-period leadership game equilibrium strategies of our two agent types, we are now
well equipped to proceed to the analysis of the feedback from ideological strength qt
to strategies across generations. Given that agents only live one period of adulthood,
players in the von Stackelberg game change every period. In other words, the same game
is played by the next generation, with the level of strength qt attained by socialization
of agents in the previous period as the initial condition. This allows us to observe the
law of motion of qt and potential economic transitions over time. In what follows, we
assume that a change of system in our model occurs once the strength of the follower
type dominates that of the leader type in the con￿ ict function.
4.1 Capitalism and the Communist Revolution
We ￿rst consider the dynamics underlying the transition from a market-based to a
centrally-planned economic system. We can state:
Proposition 1 (Communist Revolution) Suppose type A is initially weaker than
type B (q0 < 0:5). Given ￿A(￿t)￿, sB￿
t , and the law of motion of qt, the optimal saving
by type B￿ s is increasing in qt. This implies that a higher qM;t+1 will result in more
savings by type B￿ s in the next generation von Stackelberg game (
@sB￿
t+1
@qt+1 > 0). Such a
trend continues until qt > 0:5 where a communist revolution becomes credible.
Proof of Proposition 1. We derive the e⁄ect of the relative strength of workers










> 0 if qt < 0:5
< 0 if qt > 0:5
: (29)The Grand Experiment of Communism 16
Thus, for any low qt < 0:5, we have
@sB￿
t
@qt > 0. In words, the optimal reaction functions
of the two types in the von Stackelberg game of class struggle under markets lead to a
progressive increase of qt until it surpasses some ￿ critical mass￿ . Beyond this threshold
type A￿ s become su¢ ciently strong and ideologically determined to represent a credible
threat to overthrow the existing capitalist social order. For qt > 0:5, a communist
revolution happens with probability qt; alternatively, the optimal savings by type B￿ s,
sB￿
t , become decreasing in qt stabilizing the capitalist market-economy system.
Our interpretation of Proposition 1 is the following: a capitalist system is only fea-
sible when type A￿ s are weaker than type B￿ s (q0 < 0:5). An increase in this strength
caused by social resentment induces more savings by future capital owners. This in-
creases the e¢ ciency of the system, augmenting the revenues of the capital owners; but
it also increases inequality, feeding the resentment of type A agents, and ultimately
increasing the probability of a regime change. So as the working class increases mobi-
lization and becomes more ideologically motivated to overthrow the system, capitalists
accumulate more. Hence, the market system moves towards its fall as resentment within
type A agents has a reinforcing e⁄ect on capital accumulation, and inequality, rather
than mitigating it. Historically, this could be relevant to the case of the uprising of the
working class in Russia, on which we focus here.
Corollary 1 Should a communist revolution not occur when qt > 0:5, the substantial
threat from strong type A￿ s revolting induces the leader to accommodate its strategy in
search of a compromise by decreasing savings, sB￿
t , mitigating inequality and stabilizing
the market system.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 1.
The alternative in Corollary 1 occurs because for relatively strong type A￿ s the
probability of a regime change is perceived by type B￿ s as credible, thus the latter adapt
their behavior. Given the optimal socialization e⁄ort of type A agents and the law of
motion of qt, an increase in the probability of a regime change (qt+1 > qt) induces a
reduction in capital accumulation by the only type who can save under the system and,
as a result, in income inequality. By reducing the ideological determination of type A￿ s
to change the status quo, such a reaction by capital owners can avoid slipping towards
communism. Historically, this seems to have been the case of social democracies and
the welfare state, where democratization of capitalism and redistribution of income have
preserved the market system (although modi￿ed). This scenario is not at the center of
our interest, and has been analyzed elsewhere in the literature.
4.2 Communism and the Transition to Markets
We turn to the dynamics underlying the transition from a centrally-planned to a market-
based economic system in another proposition:
Proposition 2 (Market Transition) Suppose type B is initially weaker than type A
(qT > 0:5) and that Lemma 3 holds. Given ￿A(￿t)￿, sB￿
t and the law of motion of
qt, the optimal saving by the egalitarian planner is increasing in 1 ￿ qt. This implies
that a higher qC;t+1 will results in more savings by the egalitarian planner in the next
generation von Stackelberg game (
@S￿
t+1
@qt+1 < 0). Such a trend continues until qt < 0:5
where a transition back to a market-based economy becomes credible.Farvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 17
Proof of Proposition 2. We derive the e⁄ect of the relative strength of market














> 0 if qt < 0:5
< 0 if qt > 0:5
: (30)
Thus, for any high qt > 0:5 (i.e. any low 1 ￿ qt < 0:5),
@S￿
t




In words, the optimal reaction functions of the two types in the von Stackelberg game
of con￿ icting beliefs under communism lead to a progressive increase of 1 ￿ qt, i.e.
a progressive decrease of qt until it drops below certain ￿ critical mass￿ . Beyond this
threshold type B￿ s become su¢ ciently strong and ideologically determined to cause
a credible threat to bring down communism by pro-market transition reforms. For
qt < 0:5, a market transition occurs with the probability 1 ￿ qt; alternatively, the
optimal aggregate saving, S￿
t , is increasing in qt (that is, decreasing in 1￿qt) stabilizing
the communist system.
Our interpretation of Proposition 2 is the following: a communist system is only
feasible when type A￿ s are weaker than type B￿ s (1 ￿ qT < 0:5). An increase in this
strength caused by a shift of ideology that arises from lower relative e¢ ciency under
communism induces more savings by the next egalitarian planner. He responds by at-
tempting more investment and accumulation at the aggregate level, reducing wages, total
available consumption and hence productivity. As this ultimately increases ine¢ ciency,
type B agents respond by higher socialization e⁄ort, and more discontented people who
have now observed the consequences of communism shift ideology to support a market
system. The planner responds by further increasing savings, only to exacerbate the
relative ine¢ ciency of the communist regime making it less and less sustainable.18 The
convergence of beliefs continues until the point where economic transition is triggered
and the regime reverts to the market system. Historically, this could be relevant to the
Soviet and East European case, on which we focus here.
Corollary 2 Should market transition not occur for qt < 0:5, a substantial threat from
strong type B￿ s to overturn the regime induces the leader to accommodate his strategy
in search of compromise by decreasing savings, S￿
t , increasing longer-run e¢ ciency (via
higher wages and consumption) and stabilizing the communist system.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 2.
The alternative in Corollary 2 occurs because for relatively strong type B￿ s the
probability of a regime change is perceived by the egalitarian planner as credible, thus the
latter would adapt his behavior. Given the optimal socialization e⁄ort of type B and the
law of motion of qt, an increase in the probability of a regime change (qt+1 < qt) induces
a reduction in aggregate savings by the egalitarian planner. This increases consumption
allocations (material well-being), hence productivity and ultimately the e¢ ciency of the
communist system. The latter occurs because the marginal gain in productivity from
lower saving is su¢ ciently large for the range of parameter values where Lemma 3 holds.
By reducing the ideological determination of type B￿ s to change the status quo, such
a reaction by the egalitarian planner can prolong the life of a communist regime and,
18Essentially, such a set-up resembles the overinvestment experience in communist countries during
their period of initial industrialization and subsequent attempts to increase future production (and, in
historical context, catch up with the West).The Grand Experiment of Communism 18
potentially, avoid surrendering central planning. Historically, this resembles the Chinese
social market economy, where pro-market reforms were undertaken widely in coexistence
with the centralized system.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamics of the model across generations. To elucidate
it, we brie￿ y revisit the events that lead to revolution and back to transition. Initially
under markets, a positive inequality index of ￿M;0 > 1 leads to ￿A(￿M;0)￿ > 0 from
(19), which itself brings about an increase in the strength of type A￿ s in the next period
q1. According to equation (18) and Proposition 1 this increases optimal savings in the
following period s
B;￿
1 (￿M;t > 0 ! sB
t > 0 ! ￿A
t > 0 ! qt+1 "! sB
t+1 " ! :::). This cycle
repeats every period until qt > 0:5, after which either revolution occurs (Proposition 1)
or the system stabilizes (Corollary 1). In the case of revolution, a positive ine¢ ciency
index of ￿C;T > 1 satisfying condition (27) gives ￿B(￿C;T)￿ > 0 from (25), which itself
leads to a higher proportion of B type agents in the following period qT+1. According to
equation (24) and Proposition 2, this increases optimal savings in the following period
S￿
T+1. As a result, ine¢ ciency with respect to the market system increases as long as
Lemma 3 holds, triggering a continuing cycle towards transition back to the market
system (￿C;T > 0 ! ST > 0 ! (CT #! AC;T+1 #! ￿C;T+1 #) ! ￿B
T > 0 ! 1 ￿ qT+1
"! ST+1 " ! :::). This cycle repeats every period until qt < 0:5, after which either
transition occurs (Proposition 2) or the system stabilizes (Corollary 2).
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical analysis above summarized the rise and fall of communism as a process
of experimenting with a new economic system that failed. It also showed how the same
general mechanism we emphasized as driving social evolution could generate, under
certain conditions and under minor regime-dependent speci￿city, not just the advent of
communism but also its demise. That is, we proposed a model of long-run economic
dynamics as one possible explanation for a principal insight from the history and the
turn of events during the last century and a half.
Our work is in line with North (2005)￿arguments on the process of long-run economic
change. He characterizes succinctly the nature of this social evolutionary process as
follows:
￿In contrast to Darwinian evolutionary theory, the key to human evolution-
ary change is the intentionality of the players. (...) Economic change, there-
fore, is for the most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the
actors about the consequences of their actions. The perceptions come from
the beliefs of the players ￿the theories they have about the consequences
of their actions ￿beliefs that are typically blended with their preferences.￿
(North, 2005, p. viii)
While the book by North (2005) is framed along purely descriptive argumentation, in
the tradition of the new institutional economics, the chain of logic in the last quote cer-
tainly is compatible with a more technical, statistical literature, featuring learning (that
could be Bayesian, social or of other methodological strand or aggregation level). Our
guiding principle was, therefore, to keep the framework fairly general and the learningFarvaque, Mihailov and Naghavi (June 2011) 19
process by all agents in the experiment with communism under aggregate uncertainty
￿or, more precisely, ambiguity hidden within an unattempted ever economic system ￿
quite straightforward. Of course, many more additional ingredients, considerations and
complications could be built into the set-up presented. We ourselves believe there are a
number of interesting and relevant avenues to enrich the basic model we developed. Yet
our goal with this paper was to capture the ￿ perceived reality ! beliefs ! institutions
! policies ! altered perceived reality￿chain North (2005) emphasized in words into
a coherent and general theoretical construct capable to summarize the experiment of
communism as social learning in the face of ambiguity highlighting the trade-o⁄between
equality and e¢ ciency.
Indeed, our model begins with a ￿ perceived reality￿that is unjust for our type A
agents, as they are born unequal and poorer. Their ￿ beliefs￿are thus shaped out by
the ideal of achieving equality, and are propagated by socialization and the spread
of ideology across society in our model. At this initial point in our model, however,
the world has never operated a communist economic system, to which the A types
strive. In other words, the society faces huge (aggregate) ambiguity if it decides to
attempt a change in the status quo. The experimentation with communism can, in this
light, be seen as the ￿ necessary evil￿to pass through in order to learn (more) about
(the properties of) an unknown form of socioeconomic organization. The experiment
accordingly creates its own ￿ institutions￿and ￿ policies￿ , forcing equality in incomes and
a central planning system to replace the role of capitalists and markets. But after
repeating a few generation-spans of production and consumption, the social realities
imposed by the revolution and nationalization turn out simply not to work. All members
of the communist region su⁄er lower and lower material well-being due to misaligned
incentives resulting from a distorted ownership and control structure. This will be, in
fact, the main social learning outcome after experimenting with an unknown economic
system abolishing private property and market signals: all agents will gradually discover
that communism forces equality of ownership through a centralized allocation that comes
at the cost of lower productivity and poor coordination. While observing as a reference
point the rest of the world that has remained market-based and is performing better, a
drive to pro-market reforms ￿the ￿ altered perceived reality￿￿reverts the society back
to sustainability. Although we stop modeling the chain of social evolution at this point,
it certainly does not end here, but continues by experimenting and discovering ￿ on and
on￿ .
Sometimes ￿if not often ￿in history, the society faces the unavoidable challenge to
experiment with its own existence and future under huge ambiguity. With heterogenous
agents, information sets, expectations and interests, it is not always easy to converge to
a commonly shared plan, or at least hope for such a plan to possibly end up success-
fully. Doubts, con￿ icts and ideologies emerge naturally, values and institutions evolve,
responding to evolving realities, experiences, learning. Indeed,
￿Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please:
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the
brain of the living.￿ 19
At times, the experiment discovers a positive outcome. And then society ￿nds and
19Karl Marx, 1852, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Chap. 1.The Grand Experiment of Communism 20
settles into a new (again, temporary) equilibrium, until the next unprecedented vital
change of the environment. However, when the outcome of such a social experiment is
negative, the pendulum of history swings back, or along a spiral, whose circles constitute
a gradation of hard-to-acquire knowledge.
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A Derivation of the Model Solutions
A.1 The von Stackelberg Game under Market Capitalism














We ￿rst substitute out: consumption cB
M;t from the budget constraint; income yB
M;t+1
from the production function, after taking into account the marginal return to capital;
the expected regime-dependent ine¢ ciency EB
t (￿t) from its de￿nition after noting that
ln￿M;t = 0; under a market economy ￿B
t (￿M) = ￿B
t (1) = 0 (since ￿M = 1, see above).











t ￿ qt+1 ln(￿C;t):
Next, we substitute: yB
M;t = rMsB
t￿1 and rM = ￿AM (from the production function,





















t￿1 + (￿￿AM ￿ 1)sB
t ￿
￿








A.2 The von Stackelberg Game under the Communist Plan
The egalitarian planner as a ￿rst mover maximizes utility in the name of the type A








s.t. Ct + St ￿ HC;t:
Substituting out consumption and savings from (23); the expected regime-dependent
inequality EA
t (￿t) from its de￿nition after noting that ln￿C;t = 0; qt+1 (from its law of
motion); ￿M;t = ￿
1￿￿sB
t from (8); and ￿A (￿C) = ￿A
t (1) = 0 under a centralized economy
(since ￿C;t = 1, see above).
max
St
HC;t ￿ St + ￿Yt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ qt+1)ln(￿M;t):
Next we substitute: Yt+1 = rCSt and rC = ￿AC;t (present shadow price of capital
in a communist system) in his optimization problem.
max
St
AC;t[￿Kt + (1 ￿ ￿)L] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿AC;t)St ￿ (1 ￿ qt+1)ln(￿M;t);
max
St





qt ￿ (qt ￿ q2
t)￿B(￿t)
￿￿






























Type A Type B
Figure 1: Types of Agents and SocializationThe Grand Experiment of Communism 24
tt
A (ut) * sB
t* = yt–ct yt = aAMst-1 kt = st-1
t-1
Kt = St-1 Yt = aAC,tSt-1
inheritence production saving socialization
St* = Ht–Ct tt
B (ct) *
Ht Kt sB
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